Partisanship On An Apolitical Court: The United States Court of Claims by Green, Justin J.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 4
3-15-1979
Partisanship On An Apolitical Court: The United
States Court of Claims
Justin J. Green
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Judges Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Justin J. Green Partisanship On An Apolitical Court: The United States Court of Claims, 6 Pepp. L. Rev. 2 (1979)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol6/iss2/4
Partisanship On An Apolitical Court:
The United States Court of Claims
JUSTIN J. GREEN*
The relationship between political party affiliation and the vot-
ing behavior of the judiciary has been a source of much literature.
This paper will focus primarily on the United States Court of
Claims and the relationship of its voting behavior between 1964
and 1967 to the political partisanship of its individual justices. To
provide a proper foundation for such an analysis, a brief examina-
tion of the background, history and composition of the court is in
order, as well as an overview of the jurisdictional and procedural
changes the court has undergone in recent times.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
The first Court of Claims was established by an act passed
February 24, 1855.1 Three judges were appointed to the bench and
began the task of investigating claims against the government re-
ferred to them by Congress. The court functioned exclusively as
a fact finding body, much as did the Congressional committees. 2
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University. B.A., Tulane University; M.S., Florida State University; Ph.D.,
University of Kentucky.
1. 10 Stat. 612 (1955).
2. As our infant nation grew beyond the Appalachians and stretched onto the
midwestern plains, the federal government found itself performing an ever widen-
ing variety of functions, and employing an increasing number of persons. With the
federal government's expansion, citizens increasingly complained of being un-
fairly treated. The several wars between 1800 and 1860 aggravated the situation by
broadening the potential for claims against the government vis-b-vis complex mili-
tary procurement systems. Yet the doctrine of sovereign immunity banned the ju-
diciary from hearing damage suits against the federal government. Congress,
Although the court determined the factual validity of claims and
submitted a report on each claim to Congress, the power to grant
the claim was retained by Congress. 3
After less than a decade of experience it became clear that the
court's task was too great for a fact finding body. In 1861, Presi-
dent Lincoln asked Congress to bestow on the court the "power of
making judgments final."4 Congress responded somewhat half-
heartedly in 1863 by expanding the court's authority to render
final judgments, but used the appropriations process to retain
control over some cases. 5 Congress also expanded the member-
ship of the court by providing two additional judges.6 This legisla-
tion, showing all the characteristics of a compromise, generated
one of the more curious Supreme Court cases.
In 1864, the Supreme Court ruled that it could not hear cases
appealed from the Court of Claims.7 The Court reasoned that
since judgments of the Court of Claims were not final and were
reviewed by the Secretary of the Treasury, appeals from such
judgments did not fall within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.8
The Court of Claims was thus held to be essentially a legislative
court and the Supreme Court could not exercise judicial power
over its decisions.9 In 1866, however, Congress relinquished all
appellate power over the court, thereby giving its decisions the
finality found lacking by the Supreme Court.1O
apparently empathic, utilized the private bill system to dispose of complaints
against the "sovereign." Eventually the Congressional committee system was
overwhelmed by private bills. The onslaught, in addition to problems associated
with role changes from legislator to judge then back to law maker, threatened the
integrity of the entire legislative process. As a solution Congress created a court
to serve as a fact-finder and to provide a recommended decision.
3. Id. Although it was called a court, the Court of Claims, pursuant to said
act, merely took evidence in the case and reported its conclusions to Congress.
Congress additionally retained the perogative of independently studying the evi-
dence and determining an appropriate remedy. See Madden, Aspects of Litigation
in the Court of Claims, 25 JOURNAL OF THE BAR AssOcIATION OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 397, 398-99 (1958). It was not until 1863 that the Court of Claims was au-
thorized by Congress to serve more as a true court.
4. Madden, note 3 supra, at 399. See also Evans, The United States Court of
Claims, 17 FEDERAL BAR JOURNAL 85, 86; The President's Annual Message to Con-
gress, Dec. 3, 1861, CONG. GLOBE 37th Cong. 2d Sess. 2 app. (1861).
5. 12 Stat. 765 (1863). The judgments of the Court of Claims were not to be
paid until "estimated for" by the Secretary of the Treasury. Id.
6. Id.
7. Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. 561 (1864).
8. The Gordon decision was announced without written opinion. Since Chief
Justice Taney died that year, no opinion was forthcoming from the court. Twenty
years later, in 1886, a draft opinion was published at 117 U.S. 697 (1886).
9. The theory was that reviewing a Court of Claims decision after, in effect,
being authorized by the Secretary of Treasury would be an exercise of original ju-
risdiction and not appellate jurisdiction. Such a grant was not given the Supreme
Court. Id. See also U.S. CoNsT. art. 3, § 2, Madden, note 3 supra, at 399.
10. 14 Stat 9 (1866). See also, Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925) where it
was held that the Court of Claims was a court created under art. 3, § 2 of the Con-
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The next major change in the court's structure occurred in 1925
with the establishment of the Commissioner system." Prior to
this time the Court of Claims had utilized Reporter-Commission-
ers many of whom served on a part time basis. The exclusive
duty of these Reporter-Commissioners was to supervise the tak-
ing of depositions which comprised the evidence presented to the
court. Although there were some problems with this system of
taking evidence, the Reporter-Commissioners continued to func-
tion with relative efficiency until after World War I had begun.
The press of claims arising out of wartime purchasing activities,
however, amply demonstrated that the court's procedures had be-
come outmoded. Relief was found in the reform of the commis-
sioner system to resemble the judicial system of special
masters.12
The inauguration of the commissioner system allowed the court
to bring its docket up to date by sparing judges the time consum-
ing process of taking evidence and hearing witnesses. The com-
missioners assumed the evidence gathering task and reported
findings of fact, supported by reasons, to the court. In 1948, the
commissioners were permitted, upon request of the court, to
make findings of law as well,' 3 and in 1964, this task became
mandatory.1 4 Currently, cases are assigned to a Commissioner,
now referred to as a Trial Judge, 15 who holds all the powers that
would be held by a Judge of the District Court in a nonjury case.16
The Commissioner-Trial Judge system has served the court
well. By every report, the court's docket is not seriously backlog-
ged, in large part because it functions as an appellate court leav-
ing the task of assembling the record to the Trial Judge. This
stitution. Compare, however, language in Williams v. U.S., 289 U.S. 553 (1933)
which states that the Court of Claims is an arm of Congress in its art. I function
"to pay the debts of the United States." See U.S. CONST. art I. Later, in 67 Stat. 226
(1953) it was expressly declared that the Court of Claims was "a court established
under article III of the Constitution of the United States." Id.
11. 43 Stat. 964 (1925).
12. See the contrast by Bennett, The United States Court of Claims; A 50-Year
Perspective, 29 FEDERAL BAR JOURNAL 284, 293-95 (1970).
13. 62 Stat. 923 (1948).
14. Ct. Cl. Rules, Rule 13(6). This same rule provided for the Commissioner to
make findings of fact in such other cases as the court may direct. Id.
15. General Order Number 2 of 1973, August 1, 1973.
16. Id. If facts are undisputed, one of the parties may move for Summary
Judgment in which event the trial court will render a decision. If a factual ques-
tion arises the case can be remanded for trial. When Summary Judgment pro-
ceedings are inappropriate, the Trial Judge's report, with findings of fact and
conclusions of law, serves as the basis for proceedings before the court.
system also serves the public well in that Trial Judges may travel
to any convenient location to obtain evidence or to hear wit-
nesses. What has emerged from the original Reporter-Commis-
sioner structure is a system of portable trial courts meeting the
needs of both court and litigants.1 7
The most recent change in the structure of the Court of Claims
occurred in 1966.18 Legislation passed at that time expanded the
court to seven members and permitted it to sit in panels of three
judges which has now become the standard procedure of the
court. Under current court rules, a case may be heard en banc in-
itially by order of a majority of the judges in active service or by
the Chief Judge, and a rehearing may be ordered by a majority of
the active judges upon petition of one of the litigants.19 According
to the rule, such en banc hearings are reserved for cases in which
uniformity of precedent is an important question or for cases
presenting a "question of exceptional importance or difficulty." 20
Finally, since 1925, appeal from the Court of Claims is to the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.2 1 Although the record shows
that review is seldom granted, the Supreme Court has used such
cases to affect the Court of Claims jurisdiction and its procedure
in handling contract disputes. 22 More will be said about the effect
of the Supreme Court on the activities of the Court of Claims as
part of a review of the court's jurisdiction.
II. JURISDICTION
The legislation of 1855 establishing the Court of Claims set out
broad jurisdiction for the court. It authorized the court to hear:
"all claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regu-
lation of an executive department, or upon any contract express
or implied with the Government of the United States. ... 23 Al-
though the court had only the power to investigate and recom-
mend a disposition of the claim, it possessed this ability over an
17. See Bennett, note 12 supra; Evans, The United States Court of Claims, 17
FEDERAL BAR JOURNAL 85, 90-93 (1957); Madden, note 3 supra.
18. Public Law 89-425, 80 Stat. 139 (1966). For a commentary on the advisabil-
ity of adopting this change see Jacoby, Recent Legislation Affecting the Court of
Claims, 55 GEORGETOWN LAw JOURNAL 397 (1967).
19. Ct. Cl. Rules, Rule 7.
20. Id.
21. 43 Stat. 939 (1925) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1255 (1976)).
22. Each volume of the Court of Claims Reports includes information on certi-
orari petitions; the annual report of the Clerk summarizes the data for each year.
The current Clerk of the Court reports that over a ten year period ending Septem-
ber 30, 1966, the Supreme Court received 332 petitions for certiorari and granted
23. See Peartree, Statistical Analysis of the Court of Claims, 55 GEORGETOWN LAW
JOURNAL 541 (1967). Inspection of the data for more recent years reveals that the
Supreme Court still grants petitions for review in substantially less than 10 per-
cent of the cases in which it is sought. See also Bennett, note 12 supra, at 287-88.
23. Note 1 supra.
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exceptionally broad spectrum of cases. The court possessed no
equity jurisdiction; it had power only to order payment of money
by the sovereign for damages or losses arising from any of the
enumerated causes.24 The bulk of the court's jurisdiction under
the 1855 law consisted of contract disputes and tax cases. The
Tucker Act of 188725 added claims based upon the Constitution to
the court's jurisdiction.26 This Act also gave the court jurisdiction
over claims "for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not
sounding in tort. ... "27
Twentieth century legislation brought other kinds of cases
within the court's jurisdiction. Patent infringement by the gov-
ernment was made a cause of action in 191028 and copyright in-
fringement was added in 1960.29 The most important recent
legislation enabling the court to order relief incidental and collat-
eral to the awarding of damages was passed in 1972.30 Two cases
decided prior to the 1972 enactment prompted Congress to pass
this legislation and alleviate the uncertainty over the jurisdiction
of the court. In Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. United States,31
the Court of Claims carefully reasoned that its extensive jurisdic-
tion over monetary claims could logically be interpreted to grant
the court some measure of equitable powers as well. Indeed, the
strength of the court's reasoning is quite apparent in cases where
it has found a valid claim, yet the damages continue to accrue.
Quite often this is the situation when civilian or military pay
cases are decided against the government. The plaintiff typically
claims an improper discharge, dismissal, demotion or failure to
promote and seeks back salary and/or retirement benefits. If the
court decides in favor of the plaintiff, then the government is lia-
ble for damages up to the date of the judgment, unless some prior
24. See King v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 631, 390 F.2d 894 (1968), rev'd, 395 U.S.
1 (1969) wherein it was observed that the Court of Claims does not have jurisdic-
tion over cases seeking equitable relief; but only those seeking monetary damages.
See also, United States v. Alire, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 573 (1867); Zimmerman v. United
States, 422 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911, rehearing denied 400
U.S. 855 (1970).
25. 24 Stat. 505 (1887). Existing jurisdiction of the court was retained.
26. Id.
27. Kipps, A Unique National Court: The United States Court of Claims, 53
AMERICAN BAR AssoclxTION JOURNAL 1025, 1026 (1967).
28. 36 Stat. 851 (1910).
29. 74 Stat. 855 (1960).
30. 86 Stat. 652 (1972) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976)); Ct. Cl. Rules, Rule
14(c). For comment, see Marchetta, Equitable Relief in the United States Court of
Claims Under Public Law 92-415, 23 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW 465 (1973).
31. 188 Ct. Cl. 641 (1969).
event has already terminated the claim. But, if the government
fails to correct its original error, then a fresh cause of action may
be created immediately. Furthermore, a correction of the admin-
istrative record may be an important objective in itself. Compli-
ance by satisfying the judgment but refusal to remedy errors, in
an employment record for example, may have a substantial detri-
mental effect on the plaintiff in the future. The court therefore
sought to grant collateral relief by ordering the government to
take action beyond merely paying the judgment. The Supreme
Court rejected the Court of Claims' attempt to establish this
power in United States v. King in 1969.32 Congress responded
three years later by giving the court the power to order "inciden-
tal and collateral" relief, an option which has been exercised by
the court on a number of occasions. 33
To recapitulate, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction over virtu-
ally any monetary claim against the federal government as long
as the claim does not sound in tort,34 and, except in tax cases, the
court's jurisdiction is exclusive when the case involves $10,000 or
more. 35 The District Court possesses concurrent jurisdiction over
all claims for less than that amount and in all tax cases. 36
There is a continuing controversy over the court's jurisdiction
and its method of hearing the four types of cases that account for
80 percent or more of its docket: 1) contract disputes, 2) tax cases,
3) claims for civilian or military pay, and 4) cases and claims for
retirement and disability benefits. 37 While the purpose of this pa-
32. 395 U.S. 1 (1969).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976). The operative passage states:
To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the
judgment, the court may, as an incident of and collateral to any judgment
issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appro-
priate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records, and
such orders may be issued to any appropriate official of the United States.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976) states that the suable claims are claims founded
upon the Constitution, or upon an act of Congress, a regulation of an executive de-
partment, any express or implied contract with the United States, or upon a claim
for damages liquidated or unliquidated "not sounding in tort."
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1Q76) wherein the District courts are given concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Claims of "[a] ny other civil action or claim against
the United States, not exceeding $10,000." (Emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Patent and copyright infringement cases and eminent domain proceedings
are other identifiable types of cases, but there is a small percentage of cases that
defy classification. Two other tasks assigned to personnel of the Court of Claims
merit brief attention even though they are excluded from the research design.
First, private bills seeking relief are still introduced by members of Congress.
By resolution, a chamber can refer them to the Court of Claims for investigation
and a suggested disposition. Until recently, the court handled these cases as it did
all others, however, in 1966, the procedure was changed. See 80 Stat. 958 (1966);
Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). The change was necessitated by the
Supreme Court's decision in Glidden holding that the Court of Claims is an Arti-
cle HI court. Congressional reference cases are now sent to the Chief Trial Judge
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per is not to conduct a tour deforce of the court's jurisdiction and
procedure, a brief review of the literature in each of these areas is
appropriate in order to create the proper environment for the data
analysis which will follow.
A. Contract Disputes
Perhaps more than any other type of case, contract disputes
have posed major jurisdictional and procedural problems for the
Court of Claims. As Judge Bennett wrote in 1970, "this is not the
place to get into any serious discussion of a problem that cannot
be resolved by another law review article,"38 but a brief summary
of court procedure and the events of the last three decades may
illustrate the problems confronting the court and litigants in this
area.
Initially, all contract disputes are reviewed first by the agency
that is signatory to the agreement. This informal review
culminates with an agency board of contract appeals which ren-
ders the final administrative word on the claim. When brought
before the Court of Claims, the court teats such disputes as it
does all other types of claims brought to it, i.e., the case is re-
who assigns them to a Trial Judge for the usual fact finding process. The report of
the Trial Judge is reviewed by a panel of three other trial judges who then trans-
mit the recommended disposition to the originating chamber. Since adoption of
the recent legislation, judges of the Court of Claims have no contact with congres-
sional reference cases. For further information on this subject see Glosser, Con-
gressional Reference Cases in the United States Court of Claims: A Historical and
Current Perspective, 25 AMERICAN UNIVERSrrY LAW REVIEW 595 (1976); McDermott,
The Court of Claims: The Nation's Conscience, 57 AMERICAN BAR AssociATON
JOURNAL 594 (1971); Comment, The Congressional Reference Case in the United
States Court of Claims, 10 CATHOLIC UNIVERSITy OF AMERICA LAW REVIEW 35
(1961).
The other type of case heard by the Court of Claims consists of appeals from the
Indian Claims Commission. This body, and the court's appellate jurisdiction over
its decisions, was created by Congress in 1946 for many of the reasons that led to
the creation of the Court of Claims itself. See 60 Stat. 1049 (1946). Congress dis-
covered that the resolution of these claims, often based on treaties concluded a
century or more ago, was not only time consuming but was not amenable to the
legislative process. The Commission investigates the tribe's claim and renders a
decision. The first appeal is to the Court of Claims with further appeal to the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. The Commission is scheduled to terminate
its activities on September 30, 1978, and unless its life is prolonged by Congress,
the Court of Claims will probably assume the responsibility of trying these cases
through a Trial Judge as well as exercising the first appellate review of the deci-
sion. See Barker, The Indian Claims Commission: The Conscience of the Nation in
Its Dealings With the Original Americans, 20 FEDERAL BAR JOURNAL 240 (1960);
Pierce, The Work of the Indian Claims Commission, 63 AMERICAN BAR AssOCIA-
TION JOURNAL 227 (1977).
38. Bennett, note 12, supra at 299.
ferred to a commissioner for findings of fact and conclusions of
law. During this process, the commissioner and the litigants are
free to examine factual issues that had been resolved by the ap-
peals board. Thus, the proceedings before the commissioner and
the court amounted to a trial of the entire matter de novo.
In Wunderlich v. United States39 the Supreme Court ruled that
such a trial de novo was appropriate only if there was an allega-
tion of conscious fraud in the administrative proceedings. Absent
such a showing, factual determinations by the board were not re-
viewable by the Court of Claims. Congress took steps to re-estab-
lish the old system by passage of the Wunderlich Act in 1954.40
The objective of this Act was to restore the previous standard of
judicial review by requiring that board determinations be sup-
ported by "substantial evidence" and further restoring the power
to the court to set aside administrative actions that were arbi-
trary, capricious or that implied a decision in bad faith.41
Armed with this legislation the Court of Claims resumed its
practice of conducting trials de novo on both factual and legal is-
sues. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in United States v. Bi-
anchi42 tried once again to reduce the scope of review by holding
that unless allegations of fraud were involved, the Court of
Claims would be bound by the administrative record. The appar-
ent intent of the Supreme Court was to make two major changes
in the existing order. First, the respective boards of contract ap-
peals were elevated to the status of regulatory agencies with an
accompanying increase in freedom from judicial supervision de-
spite the fact that neither their personnel nor their procedures
were of the quality generally expected of regulatory agencies. 43
Second, the Court of Claims was converted into a strictly appel-
late body functioning in a manner similar to that of the Court of
Appeals in their review of agency decisions. Whereas other ap-
pellate courts have inadequate facilities, procedures or personnel
for retrying factual questions, the trial judges of the Court of
Claims are amply qualified and supported to perform this func-
tion. The Bianchi holding, thus, amounts to wasting one of the
principle assets of the Court of Claims.44 While the end of the de-
bate may not necessarily be in sight, the close analysis of the
issues it has produced has led the court into thoughtful considera-
39. 342 U.S. 98 (1951).
40. 68 Stat. 81 (1954).
41. Id.
42. 373 U.S. 709 (1963).
43. Shea, Statutory Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims: Past, Present and Fu-
ture, 29 FEDERAL BAR JOURNAL 157, 161-62 (1970).
44. Note 43 supra, at 161-65. Shea ably argues this and several other points in
opposition to the Bianchi holding. He also documents in greater detail the court's
attempt to escape both Wunderlich and Bianchi.
388
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tion of its powers and procedures. 45
B. Tax Cases
Although contract cases may be the most troublesome to the
Court of Claims because of the dual objectives of reaching a
proper decision and using the correct procedure, claims for tax re-
funds are the most numerous type of case filed in the court.46
The principal problem with the court's tax jurisdiction is not one
of complexity, but that the potential plaintiff has a choice of
courts in which to bring an action. The Court of Claims, the dis-
trict court and the Tax Court can each adjudicate some types of
suits involving payment of taxes.
The Court of Claims, as previously noted, has jurisdiction only
over claims for actual compensation, hence the taxpayer must
first pay what the Internal Revenue Service asserts is owed and
then bring a suit for a refund. The court, even after the passage
of the 1972 legislation granting the court power to give collateral
relief does not have the authority to render declaratory judg-
ments. The district court's jurisdiction is similarly circumscribed:
only claims for refunds can be adjudicated.47 In contrast, the Tax
Court can review the Service's deficiency notices and avoid the
situation in which the taxpayer is required to pay first and ask
questions of the court later. With three courts from which to
45. The literature on Wunderlich and Bianchi is voluminous and detailed.
Shea, note 44 supra and Bennett, note 1 supra provide a prbcis of the controversy
with editorial comment and references to the more detailed literature. Other high-
ly useful and informative chronological studies of the events are E. Seltzer and
Ryan, "The Court of Claims Review of Administrative Decisions," 5 BOSTON COL-
LEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERICAL LAW REVIEW 103 (1963); G.A. Cuneo and D.V.
Anthony, "Beyond Bianchi: The Impact of Utah and Grace on Judicial Review of
Contract Appeals Board Decisions," 55 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 602 (1967);
Note, "Bianchi, the Court of Claims, and Trial de novo," 54 GEORGETOWN LAW
JOURNAL 644 (1966); H.C. Miller, "Administrative Determination and Judicial Re-
view of Contract Appeals," 5 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW
REVIEW 111 (1963). The most recent thorough review directed toward potential
counsel is such cases is D.V. Anthony and B. White, "Contract Suit Practice and
Procedure in the United States Court of Claims," 49 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 276
(1973). There is a wealth of literature, which is continuously expanding, concern-
ing specific questions associated with government contract disputes. Annual com-
pilations appear in the Yearbook of Procurement Articles. For an argument that
the court could and should expand the types of relief granted in bidding disputes
see Note, "Government Contract Bid Protests- Judicial Review and the Role of the
Court of Claims," 39 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 814 (1972).
46. Peartree, note 22 supra. See also the data to be displayed infra.
47. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
choose, an obvious potential source of friction is the practice of fo-
rum shopping.
Generally, courts frown on the practice of forum shopping, es-
pecially on collegial courts when the attorney simply takes an ar-
gument to one judge after another until he finds one to grant the
relief sought. Forum shopping has historically had a negative
connotation, however, it is not necessarily an intrinsically evil
practice as it applies to the filing of tax refund suits. A parallel
situation exists in diversity actions in which damages in excess of
$10,000 are sought where the district courts and the state courts
possess concurrent jurisdiction. Similarly, when a person is
charged with violating both state and federal penal laws the re-
spective prosecutors might well engage in a bit of forum shop-
ping. In this sense, forum shopping simply means searching the
legal landscape to determine which court is more likely to favor
the client's position. Once the action is begun, obviously, trans-
fers are not looked upon favorably by any court, but a shopping
expedition prior to filing is a part of an attorney's obligation to
give the client the best representation possible.48
The question then arises as to how an attorney may choose the
most favorable court in which to bring the suit. A combination of
practical, legal and behavioral factors should be considered in the
decision. First, in considering the practical limitations, if a client
cannot pay the disputed tax before litigating, then there is no al-
ternative: the Tax Court is the only available forum. Assuming
that money is no obstacle, how should the attorney choose from
among the three courts? Again, a practical question arises. The
Tax Court and the Court of Claims have Commissioners and Trial
Judges, respectively, who will travel to a location convenient to
the taxpayer to take evidence and hear witnesses. Generally, the
district court is just as convenient since the personnel of both of
the other courts typically use the district court's facilities. If fur-
ther review is desired, however, Tax Court and Court of Claims
proceedings must be held in Washington, D.C. Although only
counsel need appear in person if oral argument is heard, this ne-
cessity will substantially increase the cost of the litigation. Fur-
ther, in the Court of Claims, the plaintiff will significantly improve
the probability of a favorable decision if Washington counsel is
retained.49 Finally, in a comparison between the Court of Claims
48. In an interesting comment Shea, note 43 supra at 167, suggests that forum
shopping be encouraged by giving all three courts involved concurrent jurisdic-
tion. His claim is that the present arrangement forces some plaintiffs into Tax
Court because they cannot pay the assessment and then litigate. He would prefer
to end the discrimination involved and give all prospective plaintiffs the same
choices.
49. Pavenstedt, The United States Court of Claims as a Forum for Tax Cases
(First Installment), 15 TAx LAw REVIEW 1, 12 (1959). According to Pavenstedt's
390
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and the district court, it was discovered that the Court of Claims
required an average of thirty-four months to dispose of tax cases,
whereas the analogous figure for all district courts was twenty-
three months.50 Court of Claims decisions, however, may only be
further appealed to the Supreme Court. To bring district court
cases to the same level of finality, i.e., a review by the Court of
Appeals, requires an average of sixteen additional months for a
total of thirty-nine months.5 1
Consideration of the legal factors involved in the choice of a fo-
rum presents a plethora of issues. Drawing comparisons on par-
ticular issues is at best a difficult task due to the fact that the
three courts can try the same types of cases and that there are
ninety-three district courts with several hundred judges. Paven-
stedt52 lists several dozen topics in his comparison of decisions by
the three courts during the period 1949-1958. In a subsequent
study, Miller did likewise for the 1961-1966 period in a lengthy ap-
pendix.53 Pavenstedt perhaps best summarizes the situation: the
attorney with a tax case to litigate should investigate the deci-
sions of the Tax Court, the Court of Claims and the appropriate
district court to determine whether a favorable precedent can be
found.5 4
Although the courts have not established general behavioral
patterns in their handling of tax cases, some tendencies have
been noted, though their utility for the practitioner appears to be
somewhat limited. Pavenstedt often favors the Court of Claims
because of the activist stance generally taken by the court.55 He
notes that the Court of Claims has a "non-technical attitude," that
it is more interested in equity than in the letter of the regulation,
study conducted between 1949 and 1958, Washington counsel won 62 percent of
their cases which was a substantially better winning ratio than that of non-Wash-
ington counsel.
50. Miller, Tax Litigation in the Court of Claims, 55 GEORGETOWN LAW JoUR-
NAL 454, 471 (1967). The datum is based on the period June 30, 1960, to June 30,
1965.
51. Id.
52. Note 49 supra.
53. Note 50 supra.
54. Note 49 supra, at 11-20, 28-33. See also, Pavenstedt, The United States Court
of Claims as a Forum for Tax Cases (Second Installment), 15 TAX LAW REVIEW
201, 201-23 (1959). The Pavenstedt articles explore the subject of how to make the
choice of a forum in much greater detail than is presented here. Although Paven-
stedt's citation of precedent is dated and thus may no longer be accurate, his gen-
eral approach to the question is orderly and thorough. For a more recent review of
decisions see Brown, Tax Refund Cases in the Court of Claims, 32 NEW YORK IN-
sTrrur-E OF FEDERAL TAXATION 1305 (1974).
55. Note 49 supra.
and that it displays no reluctance to challenge either the tax bu-
reaucracy or other court.56 Although Pavenstedt implies that the
Court of Claims is favorably oriented toward taxpayers, neither
his data nor Miller's findings support such an argument. In fact,
Pavenstedt concludes that the Court of Claims is "not a tax-
payer's court," any more so than are the district courts. 57 Miller's
analysis shows that the Court of Claims is slightly less inclined to
favor taxpayers, ruling in favor of the plaintiff in 38 percent of
the cases, compared to the district court's 48 percent, and the Tax
Court's 29 percent.58 In sum, there is little assistance to be
gleaned from aggregate data analysis; thus, Pavenstedt's often
painstaking approach is by far the best method by which to re-
solve the question.
C. Pay Cases
There are few significant jurisdictional or procedural issues as-
sociated with the Court of Claims' power to adjudicate claims for
civilian or military pay. Since such cases account for approxi-
mately 20 percent of the court's workload, it is appropriate to re-
view the sparse literature in this field. As previously noted, the
most significant problem in this area of the court's jurisdiction
was resolved in 1972 when Congress gave the court power to order
collateral relief, such as correcting administrative records, thus
filling a substantial gap in the court's authority.5 9
Persons who claim improper dismissal or discharge or failure to
obtain promotion may sue for compensatory damages. A substan-
tial number of such cases, particularly involving the military,
come to the court in the context of computing retirement benefits.
Several claims seek to contest declarations of disability and enti-
tlement to associated benefits. Each plaintiff must first exhaust
all administrative remedies including, for civilians, the Civil Serv-
ice System of appeals, and, in the case of military personnel, pro-
cedures for obtaining the correction of military records. The
plaintiff may then file suit in the Court of Claims. Unlike contract
cases, the court is free to try each case de novo. It is perhaps an
indication of the strength of the average case as well as a reflec-
tion on the quality of the administrative process that the govern-
ment's most common defenses are laches, a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and the expiration of the statute of limi-
tation.
Two commentators have summarized the behavioral tendencies
56. Note 49 supra, at 28-33.
57. Note 49 supra, at 10.
58. Note 50 supra, at 473.
59. 86 Stat. 652 (1972). See also note 34 supra.
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of the court in deciding pay cases although neither provide spe-
cific data to support their assertions. Heise 6O claims that, in civil-
ian pay cases decided between 1949 and 1961, the court was
"liberal", that is, it viewed plaintiffs' claims with relative favor.61
Since 1961, however, the government has strengthened its de-
fenses and plaintiffs in this group have been less successful. 62
Similarly, Johnson 63 examined cases in the area of military retire-
ment pay and concluded that the decisions "evidence a trend to-
ward a liberal construction of retired pay laws."'64 As in the
discussion of tax cases, the commentators' observation of a "lib-
eral" trend, or a pro-taxpayer bias, is particularly relevant to the
present inquiry into the voting behavior of the court and the ex-
tent to which political party affiliation explains the patterns that
are observed.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS
The principal focus of this paper is the behavior of the Court of
Claims between 1964 and 1976. To facilitate analysis, this period
has been divided into three shorter terms, each identified with
specific events in the court's recent history, and data have been
collected on cases decided by the court during each of the three
periods.
The first part of the data set consists of 376 cases handed down
between October 1, 1964, and September 30, 1966. During this two
year period, the bench was composed of five judges. Table 1 in
the appendix presents some basic information on each.65 Two as-
pects of these judges' careers are of great interest. First, with one
exception, they came to the court from positions of significant sta-
60. Heise, Civil Pay Cases Before the Court of Claims, 55 GEORGETOWN LAW
JOURNAL 497 (1966).
61. Id. at 505.
62. Id. at 497-98.
63. Johnson, Court of Claims Decisions in the Field of Military Retired Pay, 23
FEDERAL BAR JOURNAL 374 (1963).
64. Id. at 394. For additional commentary on military pay cases see Glasser &
Rosenberg, Military Correction Boards. Administrative Process and Review by the
United States Court of Claims, 23 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 391 (1973);
Harmel, Military Pay Cases Before the Court of Claims, 55 GEORGETOWN LAW
JOURNAL 529 (1966).
65. Background information was obtained primarily from Judge Bennett's bi-
ographies of the judges who have served on the Court of Claims contained in 211
Ct. Cl. 1, 1-235 (1976). See also, notes 3 & 4 supra; Ellison, The United States Court
of Claims: Keeper of the Nation's Conscience for One Hundred Years, 24 GEORGE
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 251 (1956); Wiecek, The Origin of the United States
Court of Claims, 20 ADMIISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 387 (1968).
tus and prestige, and second, none displays a strong partisan po-
litical background. 66 In fact, none of these judges had ever held
an elected non-judicial office, though Judge Collins had been an
active Democrat in Florida between 1930 and 1936.67 Thus, insofar
as background characteristics are concerned, the Court of Claims
between 1964 and 1966 was composed of nonpartisan, relatively
apolitical, judges.
In 1966, Congress authorized two additional judgeships for the
court.68 President Johnson nominated, and the Senate confirmed,
Byron Skelton and Philip Nichols for these positions. Skelton
had held only local political offices, but was an active Democrat
serving once as National Committeeman and as a delegate to four
national conventions. 69 As such, he was much more of a practical
politician than any of his colleagues. Nichols was a judge of the
United States Customs Court at the time of his appointment and
had served previously as Commissioner of Customs. 70 A Demo-
crat also, Nichols was not an active partisan and held no party
offices although his wife was a secretary and administrative assis-
tant to Lyndon Johnson at various times throughout his long po-
litical career. 71 The second part of the data set consists of 202
cases decided by this seven judge court between December 1,
1969, and July 31, 1971. Whereas the court during Period I was as
evenly divided as possible insofar as partisan affiliation is con-
cerned, the court in Period II consisted of a majority of Demo-
crats.
Judges Durfee and Laramore, both Republicans, accepted Se-
nior Judge status and retired from active service in 1972. Presi-
dent Nixon appointed two active Republicans, Shiro Kashiwa and
Robert Kunzig, to replace them. Kashiwa, who came to the court
from the office of Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural
Resources Division, had been active in Republican circles in Ha-
waii, once serving as Vice Chairman of the party.72 Kunzig was
Administrator of the General Services Administration when he
accepted the nomination to the court.73 Although he had never
held an elected office, Kunzig was very active in the Republican
Party in Pennsylvania as an administrative assistant and cam-
paign manager for former Senator Hugh Scott and several other
Republican candidates. 7 4
66. Note 65 supra.
67. Note 65 supra.
68. Note 18 supra.
69. Note 65 supra.
70. Note 65 supra.
71. Note 65 supra.
72. Note 65 supra.
73. Note 65 supra.
74. Note 65 supra.
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Marion T. Bennett was chosen by President Nixon to replace
Judge Collins who died in 1972. Judge Bennett was formerly a
Republican member of the House of Representatives from Mis-
souriJ 5 In 1949, he was selected to serve as a Commissioner of
the Court of Claims and "renounced further active participation
in politics."76 The confirmation of Judge Bennett returned the
court's complement to seven judges, but 1972 saw a major change
in partisan alignment. From a bench that was marginally Demo-
cratic, the court returned to the politically even division which
was characteristic of Period I. The distribution was now three
Democrats (Cowen, Skelton, and Nichols), three Republicans
(Kashiwa, Kunzig, and Bennett) and one independent (Davis).
Perhaps more importantly, the bench was now significantly more
politicized: four of the seven judges had been at some point in
their careers active partisans. The three Republican judges fit
into this category as did Democratic Judge Skelton. Data were
collected on 192 cases decided by this court between January 1,
1975, and October 31, 1976, which will be referred to as Period III.
The above data on partisan affiliation and political activity
levels will be correlated to judicial votes at a later point in this
analysis. Prior to addressing the principle research questions of
the role of partisanship in Court of Claims decisions and the
changes in court activities that might reasonably be expected to
occur in conjunction with changes in the court's membership, it is
appropriate to examine the court's decisions at an aggregate level,
although this type of analysis is almost totally descriptive in na-
ture and lacking in detail.
There are some significant changes in decisional patterns of the
Court of Claims over the three time periods. The court of Period I
(1964-66) ruled in favor of the government in 59.5 percent of its de-
cisions. In Period 11 (1969-71), the government and plaintiffs each
won exactly one-half of the cases. By Period III (1975-76), govern-
mental dominance had reasserted itself prevailing in 57.5 percent
of the courts' decisions. These statistics also indicate the exist-
ence of a source of variance that operates with a different effect in
each time period. Since the assessment and evaluation of change
75. All of the judges serving on the court between 1964 and 1976 were chosen
by Presidents who shared their party affiliation. Judge Davis, an Independent
nominated by President Kennedy, is the only exception. This tendency for Presi-
dents to choose federal judges is a well documented phenomenon. See H. ABRA-
HAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS, 60 (1974).
76. 211 Ct. Cl. 214. Bennett served as a Commissioner and then as Chief Com-
missioner of the court until his nomination to the bench.
over time is one of the research objectives, there is potential
profit in investigating, first, the correlates of success in a suit and,
second, the stability of these relationships over time. In social
science literature, one of the most frequently used variables in
the study of judicial decisions is the nature of the litigants. In
Court of Claims cases this is not only an appropriate variable, in
part because the federal government always defends in actions,
but also because several interesting relationships materialize as
Table 2 (in appendix) demonstrates.
It is apparent that the changes in decision patterns are not
identical for the two types of plaintiffs over the three time peri-
ods. Although business experienced significant changes in their
success rate, the variance for individual plaintiffs was much
larger. There were no major changes in the court's jurisdiction or
procedures that would explain this result. Breaking down the
cases by type of claim, however, does shed a little more light as to
the source of this substantial variance.
Business claims nearly always involve either contract or tax
disputes. Individuals file a few contract cases, but most of their
claims are based on taxes or on their employment by the govern-
ment. The changes in the ratio of claims granted in the contract,
tax, and military pay areas over the three time periods are gener-
ally consistent with the overall percentages. In Period I the court
granted only 20.5 percent of the civilian pay claims. In Period II,
the proportion of successful claims rose to 47.1 percent but then
fell back to 29.0 percent in Period Ill. A number of the articles re-
viewing the civilian pay literature suggest a reason for these ex-
traordinary fluctuations. Heise may, however, have identified the
solution when he referred to the court as being "liberal" in these
cases between 1946 and 1961.77 Given the absence of a legal rea-
son for the changes, it could be hypothesized that the aggregate
structure of judicial attitudes during the period 1969-71 was one
that tended to look with favor on claims pressed by persons for
pay due them in their capacity as federal civilian employees.
IV. THE COMMISSIONER SYSTEM
As previously noted, the Commissioners, or Trial Judges as
they were designated in 1973, play an important role in the court's
handling of claims. Even though the court has original jurisdic-
tion, it functions primarily as an appellate court. Procedurally,
the court functions as do most appellate courts, in that it reviews
briefs and hears arguments rather than taking testimony.78 Thus,
77. Note 60 supra.
78. The testimony is given to the Commissioner in a trial. The evidence is
then transcribed and made a part of the Commissioner's report. This report, along
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Court Rule 7 accurately describes the Court of Claims as an ap-
pellate court, in spite of how it may appear on an organizational
chart of the federal judiciary.7 9
The fact that the Trial Judges are part of the Court of Claims
raises an interesting question. Typically, appellate courts review
decisions of courts that are organizationally inferior to them and
with which they have few direct relationships. The Court of
Claims is somewhat different, however, in that the Trial Judges
constitute a department within the court. Due to the proximity of
the Court of Claims to its trial division, there exists the possibility
that the Trial Judge is the true decision maker rather than the
court. There are two ways in which to evaluate this statement:
first, by an examination of the extent to which the court accepts
the Trial Judge's findings, and, second, by comparison of the re-
sults of cases that have been heard by the Trial Judges to the
courts' decisions on motions for Summary Judgments. In neither
case is the data analysis conclusive as both approaches to the
question involve assumptions of randomness and the absence of
prejudicial exogenous sources of variance. In spite of the uncer-
tainty involved, the significance of the question justifies the in-
quiry. As the situation stands the data amounts to a prima facie
case that the judges and not the Trial Judges are making the dici-
sions. The rather significant increase in the frequency with which
the Trial Judge's decision is set aside is unsettling and at a mini-
mum demands further inquiry.
Focusing initially on the manner in which the court disposes of
the Trial Judge's findings, it is evident from the data that the
court is not inclined to affirm arbitrarily their recommendations.
In the first time period (1964-66), the court rejected 4.2 percent of
the recommendations and modified another 30.6 percent. The
court in Period 11 (1969-71) rejected 7.3 and modified 14.5 percent.
The most recent court (1975-76) reversed the Trial Judge in 15.6
percent of the relevant cases and modified 12.5 percent of the rec-
ommended decisions. A total absence of rejections or modifica-
tions, however, would not have led to a determinative conclusion,
since it is possible that the court carefully examined each case
and decided to adopt the Trial Judge's recommended decision.80
with the oral argument of the parties, is presented to the court which, subse-
quently, makes its ruling. See generally, note 12 supra.
79. Ct. Cl. Rules, Rule 7.
80. Given the highly complimentary statements about the trial division that
appear in literature, such a lack of disagreement would not have been too surpris-
The data relevant to the second part of the question, relating to
the comparative differences between the results of cases heard by
the Trial Judge and those decided by the court on motions for
Summary Judgment are presented in Table 4 (in appendix).
These data show a mixed result. If the court were to accept un-
critically the Trial Judge's decision and the court and the trial di-
vision did not share the same perspectives on law and on policy
then there would be substantial differences in decisional patterns
between cases disposed of on Summary Judgment and the recom-
mended result filed by the Trial Judge. Clearly, such evidence is
not present in the first time period: there is a difference of only 2.2
percent between the two claim denial rates. The subsequent time
periods present greater difficulty since the differences of 13.1 per-
cent and 16.9 percent are relatively high.81
A conservative interpretation of the data indicates that the
court is performing a substantial review function. Thus, when
analysis of judicial votes is undertaken, the votes are best ac-
cepted as valid expressions of judicial opinions and not as echoes
of the trial division. Indeed, there is a clear indication that the
Trial Judges and the court are following divergent paths. The re-
versal rate in Period III is approaching the frequency with which
the courts of appeal reverse district courts. 82 Further, the data in
Table 4 suggest that the court and the trial division have some
fundamental disagreements. These disagreements are most nota-
ble in the area of civilian pay cases and several explanations of
this phenomenon are possible. Earlier tables have indicated that
the court has fluctuated rather wildly in its propensity to grant
claims particularly those involving civilian pay claims. Some dis-
parity in patterns and a relatively low reversal rate would be ex-
pected due to the fact that court precedents are always too late to
affect those cases in which the Trial Judge has already filed a de-
cision. When the court shifts positions as widely as it did during
these time periods, the trial division may well find the court's de-
cisions confusing and of diminished value as guidelines. Thus,
the patterns reported here may be a reflection of this factor. The
decision to use panels of three judges to decide cases rather than
to have them heard en banc may be another relevant factor.83
This, however, applies only to the third time period and will be
considered as part of the investigation of judicial voting behavior.
ing had it occurred. All of the literature describing the Commissioner system re-
flects this point. See notes 3 & 4 supra.
81. Analyzing the type of cases reveals that civilian pay cases account for
much of this disparity.
82. The reversal rate by courts of appeals in cases appealed from district
courts between July 1, 1972, and June 30, 1973, is 17.9 percent. S. EARLY, JR., CON-
STITUTIONAL COURT OF THE U.S. 34 (1977).
83. See, note 19 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 6: 381, 1979] An Apolitical Court
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
V. PARTISANSHIP ON THE COURT OF CLAIMS
The relationship between judges' political party affiliation and
their votes has been a principle focus of the judicial behavior
literature. No generalizations are immediately apparent from an
examination of the literature, and it seems clear that, if the rela-
tionship is to be identified precisely, more courts must be investi-
gated. Previous research suggests that three situational variables
determine, at least in part, the extent to which judicial votes cor-
relate with judges' party affiliation: 1) the extent to which the
court is politicized, 2) the physical structure of the court, and 3)
the types of cases that the court decides.
Adamany8 4 speculated that the involvement of the court in par-
tisan politics would affect the voting behavior of the judges. He
tested the accuracy of his observation by comparing the Supreme
Courts of Wisconsin and Michigan. The Michigan court was
widely recognized as a politicized institution, and studies by Fee-
ley,8 5 Schubert,86 and Ulmer87 reported partisan affiliation to be
an axis of division. The Wisconsin Supreme Court is less closely
related to partisan politics, particularly insofar as judicial se-
lection is concerned, and party affiliation explains less of the vari-
ance in voting behavior than in Michigan. 88 Beiser and
Silberman,89 reporting on the New York Court of Appeals, draw
conclusions similar to those of Adamany for the same general rea-
son: the level of politicization. The lower federal courts, including
the Court of Claims, would certainly qualify as partisan in nature,
primarily because of the distinctive relationship between party
and judicial selection.90 Goldman,9 1 studying the United States
Court of Appeals from 1961 to 1964, found a correlation between
partisan affiliation and decisions in several areas. Walker,92 ana-
84. Adamany, The Party Variable in Judges' Voting: Conceptual Notes and a
Case Study, 63 AMERICAN POLrnICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 57 (1969).
85. Feeley, Another Look at the "Party Variable" in Judicial Decision Making:
An Analysis of the Michigan Supreme Court, 4 PoLrrY 91 (1971).
86. Schubert, QuANTrrrVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR, 129 (1959).
87. Ulmer, The Political Party Variable in the Michigan Supreme Court, 11
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 352 (1962).
88. Note 84 supra, at 73.
89. Beiser & Silberman, The Political Party Variable: Workmen's Compensa-
tion Cases in the New York Court of Appeal4 3 PoLrrY 521 (1971).
90. With one exception all the judges on the Court of Claims were nominated
by presidents of their own party. See note 75 supra.
91. Goldman, Voting Behavior on United States Courts of Appeals 1961-64, 60
AMERICAN POLITCAL SCIENCE REVIEW 374 (1966).
92. Walker, A Note Concerning Partisan Influences on Trial-Judge Decision
Making, 6 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 645 (1972).
lyzing the decisions of district court judges, did not find partisan
influences in civil liberties cases, but did not investigate the civil
areas in which Goldman found most of the significant associa-
tions. Thus, the political attributes of the court must be the start-
ing point for developing a general statement concerning the
relationship between party affiliation and judicial decisions.
After observing the differences between the Wisconsin and
Michigan Supreme Courts in terms of the party variable,
Adamany speculated that the physical environs of the decision
making process are material to the existence of the relationship.93
He argued that on a court such as the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in which the members frequently interact, conflicts are resolved
more often than on "loner" collegial courts such as the Michigan
Supreme Court, hence stifling party based disagreement.9 4 It ap-
pears that although physical arrangements might be relevant to
the level of dissent on a court, they are at best tangentially re-
lated to the type of disagreement. Through frequent informal
consultation and the imposition of stringent deadlines for the
filing of dissenting opinions, a court might acquire unanimity in
nearly all of its decisions, but, when dissenting judges fail to form
blocs based on party affiliation the physical structure of the court
is not an immediately obvious cause. Thus, Canon and Jaros 95
might profitably have included such a variable in their analysis of
the level of dissent on state supreme courts, but any correlation
with partisan voting would be fortuitous.
The third factor in the analysis of this particular aspect of judi-
cial behavior regarding the types of cases decided by the courts is
more descriptive of the research design employed than of the
courts involved. Such considerations may well affect the conclu-
sions drawn and thus should be noted. With the success that stu-
dents of judicial behavior have experienced in the scaling and
bloc analysis of United States Supreme Court civil liberty deci-
sions, it seems odd that whenever criminal or civil liberty deci-
sions of any court are examined for evidence of partisan
influence, the search is often fruitless. Because judicial analysts
have generally confined their research designs to one or two types
of cases, their conclusions about judicial behavior are content
specific. Relationships seem to appear and vanish depending
upon the manner in which cases are chosen. For example,
Goldman 96 and Nage197 found evidence of partisan influence only
in certain types of economic cases. These peculiarities of re-
93. Note 84 supra.
94. Id.
95. Canon & Jaros, State Supreme Courts: Some Comparative Data, 42 STATE
GOVERNMENT 260 (1969).
96. Note 91 supra.
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search design make it difficult to derive a generalization, a prob-
lem Adamany claims can be resolved only by "more careful
conceptualization and more rigorous testing of a provocative hy-
pothesis."98
The Court of Claims presents an intriguing combination of vari-
ables and, therefore, possesses considerable potential for a useful
and productive investigation of the issue. Since the partisan na-
ture of the court has changed between each of the three time pe-
riods, the Court of Claims is a superb source of data to test
Adamany's conclusions about the role of partisanship. The court
is also a collegial body similar to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Although often divided into panels, it sits together and the mem-
bers have frequent formal and informal contact with each other.
The biographies written by Judge Bennett often refer to the spirit
of collegiality on the court and the friendship and respect which
the judges have for each other.99 Fortunately, the court hears
only those cases involving economic issues which are likely to
display a correlation between partisan affiliation and voting be-
havior. Every case pits a claimant against the federal govern-
ment. Using the concept of partisanship elaborated upon by
Schubert' 00 early in the study of judicial behavior, it seems rea-
sonable to expect the following manifestations of partisanship in
judicial voting: Democratic judges are expected to vote in support
of suits by private individuals and against business claims. How-
ever, the type of hypothesis to be tested is more ambiguous. In
general, because of the relatively nonpartisan and highly collegial
nature of the bench in Period I, an association between party affil-
iation and judicial voting is not expected. It is more likely that a
relationship will appear in Periods II and III due to the change in
the court's personnel. Hence, it is hypothesized that the relation-
ship between party affiliation and judicial voting will increase
over time.
The method of testing such hypotheses has also been consid-
ered in the literature. Nagel'01 simply calculated the number of
times that each judge voted in the expected direction and then
evaluated the scores in terms of a court mean. Democrats were
97. S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE 227
(1969).
98. Note 84, supra at 73.
99. Note 64 supra.
100. Schubert, The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological Analysis,
56 AMERICAN POLrMCAL SCIENCE REVIEW 90 (1962).
101. Note 97 supra.
expected to cluster to one side of the mean, Republicans to the
other. Adamany1O2 found this approach to be inadequate.
Adamany prefers the attitudinal scaling approach of Ulmer,10 3
Schubert,1 0 4 and others, but argues strongly that the techniques
used to study collegial courts can be borrowed from research on
legislative behavior. 0 5 However, a problem arises in that the data
may not be amenable to such highly sophisticated statistical ma-
nipulations, i.e., the technique must be appropriate for the data.
Using the Nagel approach, pro-business and pro-individual sup-
port scores were calculated for each judge. Table 5 (in appendix)
displays these as a percentage of the votes cast in all cases to
which each type of plaintiff was a party. For convenience, the
judges are listed in order of seniority and the party affiliation of
each judge is indicated.
As indicated above, the first hypothesis was that there would be
no relationship between party affiliation and voting behavior in
Period I. Table 5 shows conclusively that this hypothesis should
be accepted. The mean support scores in business cases for Dem-
ocrats and Republicans are virtually identical and the difference
in cases involving individuals as plaintiffs is not significant. Fur-
thermore, in the latter category, the scores are in the opposite di-
rection from that predicted by the hypothesis: both Democratic
judges voted for the individual less often than did the two Repub-
lican judges. It seems obvious that partisan affiliation is not cor-
related with judicial voting behavior in Period I.
The hypothesis specified that the party/voting behavior correla-
tion would be higher in the second time period because the bench
consisted of a Democratic majority and included at least one addi-
tional judge with a background as an active partisan. 0 6 Again,
however, the table displays little evidence of a relationship be-
tween the two variables. Contrary to expectations the mean sup-
port score for Democratic judges is higher than for Republicans in
business cases and a Democrat, Collins, has the highest support
rate. The means for cases brought by individuals are as expected
but are so similar that party identification is not associated with
voting behavior.
Period III presents more complicated patterns. Eighteen of
the twenty en banc cases heard during the period were brought
by businesses. An examination of the votes in these cases reveals
102. Note 84 supra, at 58-59.
103. Note 87 supra.
104. Note 100 supra.
105. For an introduction to these methods see L. ANDERSON, M. WATTS JR., & A.
WiLEo, LEGISLATIVE RoLL-CALL ANALYsis (1966).
106. This method of counting partisans is quite conservative since other judges
may be just as committed to the programs, etc. of their party and been nearly as
active in the party but not have held a formal office.
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a very high relationship between party and voting behavior. The
means for each party are significantly different and, as expected,
the three Republican judges favored the claim most often
whereas the three Democratic judges least often. Although the
bench was evenly divided between the parties, at least four
judges had partisan backgrounds. Examination of en banc cases
shows that this increased level of politicization is identifiable in
the judges' votes.107
Votes cast by members of panels do not fall into such an identi-
fiable pattern. In business cases, a Democrat (Nichols) was more
supportive than expected, and a Republican (Bennett) was far
less inclined to support the claim than either of his colleagues.
Hence, although the means differ in the expected direction, the
amount of the difference is too small to support the conclusion
that party affiliation is a relevant variable. In cases brought by in-
dividuals, the mean support scores are significantly different, but
in the opposite direction than was expected. It must therefore be
concluded that the relationship between party identification and
voting behavior, so clearly manifested in en banc cases, did not
exist in cases heard by panels. Thus, in general, when using this
type of analysis, the Court of Claims is not a court in which party
affiliation and voting behavior are related 08
Simply put, the Court of Claims appears to be a very harmoni-
ous court. 0 9 In Period I, nearly all of the dissenting votes were
cast by retired Court of Claims Judge Samuel E. Whitaker sitting
by designation. The dissent rate for the five appointed judges was
.3 percent. In Period II, the effects of politicization might be
demonstrated by the dissent rate which increased substantially to
7.4 percent. The two new judges, Nichols and Skelton, were most
active with dissent rates of 4.0 percent and 3.5 percent, respec-
tively. In nearly all cases, their dissents were solitary which is
most unusual for new judges on collegial courts. Typically, they
do not draw attention to themselves by casting the sole dissenting
vote, indeed, the prospect of a solitary dissent appears to present
strong psychological and social barriers to be overcome. In Period
III, there were a total of 21 cases in which one or more dissenting
107. The hypothesis cannot be tested for cases involving claims by individuals
since only two such cases were heard en bane.
108. The demand that more sophisticated blocking and scaling techniques be
used cannot be met with these data.
109. Note 95 supra. Such apparent harmony can be deceptive, see Atkins &
Green, Consensus on the United States Courts of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?, 20
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PoIrncAL SCIENCE 735 (1976).
votes were cast. However, only eleven of these cases were heard
by panels even though panels hear 89.6 percent of the cases.
Clearly, the pressures against solitary dissents are very strong on
the Court of Claims as they are on all other three member
courts.1 10 As the data in Table 5 suggest, the dissenting votes in
en banc cases fall into patterns related to party affiliation, but due
to the relatively small number of votes involved, a more intensive
analysis appears appropriate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although additional data sources, such as conference notes, are
desirable for this analysis, it is obvious that the Court of Claims
underwent two major changes between 1964 and 1976. At first, it
presented the image of a monolithic court in which dissent was
not condoned and partisanship was totally absent. When the
bench was expanded in 1966 by the addition of two Democrats,
the court greatly modified its general assessment of civilian pay
claims just as one would expect if there was pressure to suppress
opposition to the newly formed Democratic majority. However,
little else changed; businesses slightly improved their prospects
of winning a suit, but not to the extent of the change in disposi-
tion of civilian pay cases. The dissent rate in this period in-
creased by nearly 2500 percent. This can be attributed, in part, to
the expansion of the court which provided a greater opportunity
for finding partners in dissent, but the active roles of the new
members as dissenters is an unexplained phenomenon.
The changes in both personnel and procedure between 1969-71
and 1975-76 raise a number of questions that are left unanswered
by the data. Businesses won 65 percent of their cases that were
tried en banc, but only 39.2 percent of their panel cases. Partisan-
ship and dissent behavior are evident on the en banc court, but
exist at a minimal level, if at all, on the panels. There are legal
and/or sociological factors at work here which remain hidden at
this time.
With respect to the basic focus of the research, the role of the
party variable, the Court of Claims leaves few unanswered ques-
tions. Partisanship was not a factor in the court's decisions, in-
deed, Judge Bennett's renunciation of partisan activity when he
became a Commissioner of the court appears to reflect a strongly
felt court norm. The data contradict Adamany's expectation that
partisanship in judicial recruitment is associated with partisan-
ship in judicial voting. Alternatively, Adamany is accurate in his
110. Atkins, Judicial Behavior and Tendencies Toward Conformity in a Three
Member Small Group: A Case Study of Dissent Behavior on the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals, 54 SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 41 (1973).
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claim that, if future research on the "provocative hypothesis" is to
be fruitful, then more innovative operationalizations of the party
variable are essential preconditions.I1 ' This study of the Court of




Judges of the Court of Claims: 1964-66


























Decisions According to Type of Plaintiff*




















* Decisions to remand are excluded from this and all further tables.
** Includes cases filed by corporations, partnerships and individuals in a business
capacity.









Changes in Proportion of Claims Won, Over Time
Period I v. Period II v. Period I v.














Comparison of Summary Judgments and Recommended
Decisions by Trial Judges
Period I Period II Period III
(1964-66) (1969-71) (1975-76)
Summary Recom- Summary Recom- Summary Recom-
Judg- mended Judg- mended Judg- mended
ments Decision ments Decision ments Decision
Denied 61.2% 59.0% 57.6% 44.5% 63.4% 47.0%
Granted 38.8% 41.0% 42.4% 55.5% 36.1% 53.0%
Table 5
Plaintiff Support Scores (In percentages)
Pro-Business Pro-Individual
Period
Period I Period II Period III* III- Period I Period I Period II* Period III*
Judge (1964-66) (1969-71) (1975-76) (1975-76) (1964-66) (1969-71) (1975-76) (1975-76)
Cowen (D) 48.6 53.6 53.3 37.5 32.8 43.8 34.8
Laramore (R) 48.8 51.8 50.01 33.2 42.2 33.33
Durfee (R) 46.6 53.6 36.42 33.5 42.2 33.34
Davis (I) 47.7 51.4 62.5 56.3 33.1 42.2 48.0
Collins (D) 46.4 56.5 32.2 45.3
Skelton (D) 53.6 44.4 32.3 43.8 29.6
Nichols (D) 52.6 64.7 52.2 39.1 27.6
Kunzig (R) 72.2 47.1 41.2
Kashiwa (R) 76.5 44.4 35.0
Bennett (R) 72.2 34.3 35.7
Democratic Mean 47.5 54.1 54.1 40.7 32.5 43.0 30.7
Republican Mean 47.7 52.7 73.6 41.9 33.4 42.2 37.3
Court Mean 47.6 53.3 63.7 43.4 33.0 42.7 . 36.0
En banc cases only (N=18), all filed by businesses
* Panel cases only
Sat by designation in 10 cases
Sat by designation in 22 cases
3 Sat by designation in 9 cases
' Sat by designation in 15 cases
